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Oh
friends, my friends—
bloom how you must, wild
until we are free.
—Cameron Awkward-Rich,
Cento Between the Ending and the End

LGBTQIA+ communities are still learning how and why to center
Black trans lives in their individual and collective politics. These
communities are coming to understand the power of saying—as the Black
Queer & Intersectional Collective of Columbus, Ohio has explained—
”that the liberation of Black LGBTQIA+ people will lead to liberation for
all people,” including all LGBTQIA+ people, and that “the freedom of
Black queer and trans people cannot exist if another group is oppressed;
our liberations are intertwined.” 1 As these understandings take root
outside the collectives and collective practices that help produce them,
they are yielding cascading transformations in political consciousness that
are reshaping what LGBTQ life is and what LGBTQ politics are about.
*
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1. Mission and Principles, B LACK QUEER & INTERSECTIONAL C OLLECTIVE,
https://bqic.net/mission-principles/. Cf. also, e.g., Fannie Lou Hamer, “Nobody’s Free Until
Everybody’s Free,” Speech Delivered at the Founding of the National Women’s Political Caucus,
Washington, D.C., July 10, 1971, in THE S PEECHES OF F ANNIE LOU HAMER: TO TELL IT LIKE IT IS
134 (Maegan Parker Brooks & David W. Houck eds., 2011); Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from
Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), in MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE C AN’T WAIT 77, 79
(1963). For some classic, critical thinking on identity, politics, and community, see Steven Seidman,
Identity and Politics in a “Postmodern” Gay Culture: Some Historical and Conceptual Notes, in
F EAR OF A QUEER P LANET: QUEER P OLITICS AND S OCIAL THEORY 105 (Michael Warner ed., 1993).
After the initial use of “LGBTQIA+” to track the language used by Black Queer & Intersectional
Collective, I use the shorter “LGBTQ” in the remainder of the work. I don’t intend to be making any
big theory point with these or other identity terms. A new intervention on this front is in T. Anansi
Wilson, Sexual Profiling & BlaQueer Furtivity: BlaQueers on the Run, (June 1, 2021) (forthcoming),
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Here, I seek to think with queer Black trans politics—and in
particular, from among their far-ranging commitments, their
intersectional understandings and demands to center Black trans lives—
about a set of questions nested in federal constitutional law. Nominally,
the aim is to reflect on a real-time constitutional situation—driven by the
Supreme Court’s newly enthroned constitutional originalist project—that
has placed the constitutional abortion right first announced in Roe v. Wade
and reaffirmed by Planned Parenthood v. Casey on the brink of
extinction. 2 Vitally important in its own terms, this extinction is one that
many fear (even as some others hope) will lead to LGBTQ constitutional
rights and protections likewise being eliminated. The conceptual
configuration around this potential one-two punch—played out around
what the Court’s ruling in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization will do to the abortion right and to LGBTQ constitutional
rights by implication—expresses conventional forms of legal
consciousness and the politics that they have helped inspire. 3 Produced by
and within legal outlooks that have traditionally operated in single-axis
identity terms, these ways of understanding constitutional developments
around Dobbs miss what queer Black trans politics can readily see: The
conventional constitutional fields of abortion rights and LGBTQ rights are
not wholly distinct, related only in a legal series, but rather are aspects of
a larger constitutional law that intersect and cross-inflect one another, and
that likewise intersect and cross-inflect the Court’s constitutional race
equality jurisprudence, itself a jurisprudence of colorblind
constitutionalism increasingly organized under the sign of constitutional
originalism, that has been turning against pro-Black, including pro-Black
trans, and hence LGBTQ, positions for some time.
On one level, these understandings make the work of thinking with
queer Black trans politics look like a familiar intersectional intervention.
In important ways, it is. The present effort broadly joins calls for moving
from traditional forms of legal and political consciousness defined by
single-axis identity thinking about race, sex, and LGBTQ identity and
rights toward newer and more complex—not to forget, more socially
accurate—forms of intersectional thinking about them and how they
work. This undertaking is thus aligned with longstanding intersectional
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
3. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021). For relevant reflection s
on constitutional law as a source of legal and lived consciousness, see Peter Gabel, The
Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. R EV.
1563, 1573–74 (1984).
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praxis pushing to reconceptualize basic outlooks on U.S. constitutional
civil rights. 4 Beyond demonstrating some of the transformative
possibilities of thinking with queer Black trans politics, however, the
argument in these pages also shows that intersectional praxis is making its
way into civil rights litigation while also giving shape to conservative
resistance to it. On this level, thinking with queer Black trans politics
offers opportunities to glimpse how intersectional thinking is functioning,
if not by name, as a tool not only supporting, but also opposing, pro-Black
intersectional praxis. 5 This opposition has formally begun at times to recast progressive civil rights like abortion and LGBTQ rights in anti-Black
terms as means of restricting or clawing them back. Venturing forth from
queer Black trans politics’ intersectional and centering demands thus
draws this creeping anti-Black intersectional practice into focus. It also
helps to explain it by exposing moments when queer Black trans people
personify the threats to existing race-sex-sexuality-gender-identity orders
that so many people, prominently including many social conservatives,
fear and oppose.
Building on understandings that emerge from queer Black trans
politics, the present work is structured as follows. Part I begins with a proBlack, queer, and trans-aligned perspective on the Court’s race equality
jurisprudence—a perspective that opens onto a critical topography of
LGBTQ constitutional rights. From there, discussion shifts in Part II to
how queer Black trans politics inform analysis in the abortion right
setting, focusing on important dimensions of the Dobbs litigation,
including how different legal actors imagine Dobbs mapping onto—and
thus implicating—LGBTQ constitutional rights. Building on this
engagement, Part III then takes up what constitutional originalism looks
like from a perspective informed by queer Black trans politics. Here,
constitutional originalism appears to be more than a force that has
constrained pro-Black politics, and more than a force poised to decimate
the constitutional abortion right in Dobbs. Originalism, on this
understanding, is also a project that implicates LGBTQ constitutional
positions—positions that have been in its sights all along as expressions
of constitutional race equality and constitutional abortion rights
guarantees. The Conclusion, Part IV, summarizes how a queer Black trans
4. One effort in the constitutional civil rights setting that should not be missed is in Devon W.
Carbado & Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, An Intersectional Critique of Tiers of Scrutiny: Beyond
“Either/Or” Approaches to Equal Protection, 129 YALE L.J. F. 108 (2019). Inflecting LGBTQ rights,
see also, for example, Kaiya Arroyo, Burden of Proof: How Intersectionality Can Inform Our View
of the Equal Protection Intent Requirement, 19 U. P A. J. C ONST. L. 1015 (2017).
5. For some important theoretical and historical context, see infra note 12.
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politics-inspired perspective refracts constitutional politics in distinctive
ways that reveal some of the powers of insight and foresight that queer
Black trans politics possess. Among the many other things they do, queer
Black trans politics offer perspectives on, and positions within, LGBTQ
politics that LGBTQ communities should seriously engage in the days
ahead, as—in the aftermath of Dobbs and anticipating other constitutional
originalist transformations—political and constitutional challenges to
LGBTQ rights continue to mount. Queer Black trans politics teach that
the security of LGBTQ rights remains largely in LGBTQ people’s hands.
I. COLORBLIND CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM AND LGBTQ RIGHTS
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL RACE E QUALITY SETTING
Tracking queer Black trans politics’ intersectional commitments and
their calls to center Black trans people, it is apparent that Black trans
people’s constitutional rights, along with the rights of other Black
LGBTQ people, have for some time now been subject to the force and
weight of the Supreme Court’s commitments to a colorblind
constitutionalism—a jurisprudence that, as it has been evolving, is
increasingly being reorganized under the sign of, and as an expression of,
constitutional originalism, a trend that the Supreme Court’s present
composition seems likely to bring to doctrinal completion. 6 Familiar as
the background constellation of points may be, they are regularly lost in
conversations about LGBTQ rights as points implicating them.
Broadly speaking, and formulated in these newer and somewhat
anticipatory terms, the Court’s colorblind originalist jurisprudence can be
figured as having generated a range of legal doctrines and rules indicating
the Court’s retreat from earlier constitutional race equality decisions that,
in different ways, marked out—and delivered on—a transformative, antisubordinationist vision of constitutionally-based racial justice, itself
articulated with an historically informed contemporary eye to what the
Civil War Amendments demand. 7
6. Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
R EV. 71 (2013), offers an important conceptual pivot. Works that illuminate different dimensions of
the evolutionary shift, while noting the challenges for colorblindness expressed as an originalist
project include id., as well as Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. R EV. 768 (1996),
and Cedric Merlin Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality: Colorblindness, Frederick Douglass, and Inverted
Critical Race Theory, 56 C LEV. S T. L. R EV. 823 (2008). For some additional reflections on the themes,
see Mary Ziegler, What is Race?: The New Constitutional Politics of Affirmative Action, 50 C ONN.
L. R EV. 279 (2018).
7. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
421 (1960); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 P HIL. & P UB. AFF. 107, 147–
77 (1976); see also, e.g., Brandon Hasbrouck, The Antiracist Constitution, 102 B OSTON U. L. REV.
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In lieu of that project, the Court’s constitutional colorblindness
decisions have aligned the Court’s racial justice docket with formal
equality principles that have been sharply critiqued for tracking racehierarchical and ideologically white supremacist positions. 8 Consistent
with what those positions recommend, the Court, years back, abandoned
playing a meaningful role in constitutionally developing, then managing,
far-reaching institutional transformations of the ideological and material
conditions of racial injustice in the United States in pro-Black directions. 9
Instead, the Court has for some time now regularly announced
colorblindness-centered or colorblindness-corresponding legal rules that,
in different ways, constrict governmental powers at the national, state, and
local levels, increasingly circumscribing the space for purposefully proBlack political outcomes to be realized in law in race-conscious ways. 10
87, 127–41 (2022); see also generally, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 B OSTON U. L. R EV. 255 (2010). For exposition built in part in
relation to the insight that “[h]istory shows that antisubordination values live at the root of the
anticlassification principle—endlessly contested, sometimes bounded, often muzzled,” see Reva B.
Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles
Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. R EV. 1470, 1477 (2004). For important legal historical work that
spotlights the Black Convention Movement and powerfully widens and reshapes the legal historical
archive, see James W. Fox Jr., The Constitution of Black Abolitionism: Reframing the Second
Founding, 23 J. C ON. L. 267 (2021).
8. For one penetrating engagement in a wider context, see Introduction to C RITICAL R ACE
THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT F ORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds.,
1995). Another forceful critique of colorblind constitutionalism as it operates across a range of
doctrinal domains is in Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L.
R EV. 1, 77–85 (2018).
9. Compare Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974),
and Gary B. v. Whitmer, 376 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (en
banc); see also, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). For a certain counterpoint, see Brown
v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), part of a wider history of federal courts’ constitutional governance of
prisons, with racial, including desegregative, inflections, on which see, Margo Schlanger, Book
Review, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. R EV.
1994 (1999) (reviewing MALCOLM M. F EELEY & EDWARD L. R UBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND
THE MODERN S TATES: HOW THE C OURTS R EFORMED AMERICA’S P RISONS (1997)), which, as part of
offering a challenge to judge-centered modes of understanding prison litigation developments,
captures how aspects of prison litigation at times contributed to the burgeoning of the prison industrial
complex. Id. at 2012 & n.68. On how some constitutional colorblindness moves inflect and so
“produce and entrench normative gender identities,” see Devon W. Carbado, Colorblind
Intersectionality, 38 S IGNS 811, 817 (2013), and for one account of “how constitutional doctrine
facilitates the incapacitation of motherhood,” see Priscilla A. Ocen, Incapacitating Motherhood, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. R EV. 2191, 2229–37 (2018).
10. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shelby County. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Merrill v. Milligan, 595 U.S.___, 142 S. Ct.
879 (Feb. 7, 2022); Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007). Also note that if a necessary constitutional touchstone for these measures is found their
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Within the same body of law, the Court has also been approving a
widening set of restrictions on political participation that enable
overlapping political playing fields in the U.S. to be tilted against African
Americans and pro-Black political outcomes by extension. 11
If, in these ways, the Supreme Court’s colorblind originalist project
implies broken promises and significant institutional retractions and
retrenchments involving the constitutional rights of Black people
generally, it also affects Black trans and other Black LGBTQ-identified
people in ways that indicate the Court’s race equality doctrines—not
themselves intersectional in official terms—nevertheless are
intersectional as governance practices that shape lived experiences. 12 The
Court’s race equality jurisprudence and constitutional race equality rights
always, at least in some sense, inscribe Black trans and/or Black LGBTQ
people’s rights. The Court’s colorblind originalism thus rules LGBTQ
peoples’ lived experiences of race-based constitutional rights.
Recognizing this, there has long been something comprehensible, if
also highly problematic and misguided, about pro-LGBTQ constitutional
rights arguments premised on racial analogies designed to get LGBTQ
people access to constitutional race equality protections’ safe harbors. The
move is comprehensible, since the Court formally sees its constitutional
race jurisprudence as being about race—not sexual orientation, or
LGBTQ identities or rights more generally. The “like-race” analogy
remains highly problematic, however, in erroneously suggesting that there
is a fully rationalizable—and sustainable—parallel to be offered as a
bridge between LGBTQ-inflected constitutional arguments, on the one
purposes or intentions, on which, see ERWIN C HEMERINSKY, C ONSTITUTIONAL LAW : P RINCIPLES
2019), whether they are facially race-based is not the sole consideration
for assessing their constitutionality.
11. Relevant reflections on this front are in Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or
Party All the Time: Three Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting
Cases, 59 WM. & MARY L. R EV. 1837 (2018), Daniel P. Tokaji, Representation and Race Blindness:
The Story of Shaw v. Reno, in R ACE LAW S TORIES (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds.,
2008), and Franita Tolson, Election Law “Federalism” and the Limits of the Antidiscrimination
Framework, 59 WM. & MARY L. R EV. 2211 (2018). Fannie Lou Hamer’s instruction on race and
democracy in the United States are still indispensable. See generally, e.g., HAMER, supra note 1.
12. For thoughts on trans*-ness and Blackness as “differently inflected names for an anoriginal
[sic] lawlessness that marks an escape from confinement and a besidedness to ontology,” see Marquis
Bey, The Trans*-ness of Blackness, the Blackness of Trans*-ness, 4 TRANSGENDER S TUD. Q. 275,
275 (2017). Additional relevant perspective, including perspective on how ostensibly nonintersectional forms of jurisprudence nevertheless are capable of validating claims of white men, is
in Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. C HI . LEGAL F. 139,
142–43 n.12 (1989). See also Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Close Encounters of Three Kinds: On Teaching
Dominance Feminism and Intersectionality, 46 TULSA L. R EV. 151, 167–69 (2013).

AND P OLICIES 768–78 (6th ed.
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hand, and constitutional arguments about race, on the other. 13 Over and
above historical differences that are not readily transcended, the
constitutional “like-race” analogy still regularly misses its own fraught
double play: de-centering and thus “marginal[izing],” when not simply
ignoring, people with Black and LGBTQ identities inside both Black and
LGBTQ communities in order to generate and preserve its conceptual
coherence. 14
“Like-race” thinking in the LGBTQ constitutional arena thus moves
in practical denial of the ways constitutional race equality decisions
inscribe LGBTQ rights and how constitutional LGBTQ rights rulings, in
turn, inscribe race equality rights. 15 Part of what makes this analogical
effort misguided in the constitutional setting is how it regularly papers
over the hard realities of what the Court’s colorblindness jurisprudence
has done to constitutional race equality protections. Its deployment within
constitutional efforts to gain—or preserve—LGBTQ constitutional rights
regularly breezes past how the Court’s colorblindness rules have fostered
inequality in Black people’s, including Black LGBTQ people’s, lives. In
these ways, “like-race” thinking in constitutional argument involving
LGBTQ rights regularly syncs with, and furthers, post-racial
13. Not that the Court’s race equality jurisprudence does not implicate sexual orientation or
sexuality, as perhaps most notably, though hardly exclusively, in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for “Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and
Equal Protection Discourse, 85 C ORNELL L. R EV. 1358, 1365, 1368 & n.54 (2000). For another
treatment of the “like-race” analogy launched from within a very different kind of project, see Janet
Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Representation, in THE P OLITICS OF
LAW 115 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). Other counterpoints against the tendencies described in the
text are in Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal
Theory and Political Discourse, 29 C ONN. L. R EV. 561, 624–34 (1997); Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
Ignoring the Sexualization of Race Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics,
47 B UFF. L. R EV. 1, 40–58 (1999); Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Rights and the
“Civil Rights Agenda,” 1 AFR-AM. L. & P OL’Y R EP. 33, 37–40 (1994); Catherine Smith, Queer as
Black Folk?, 2007 WIS. L. R EV. 379, 382–83 (2007); Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate
in the United States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R EV. 283, 314
(1994). This is not to say like-race arguments have been—or in any event, will be—abandoned. See,
e.g., Craig J. Konnoth, Note, Created in Its Image: The Race Analogy, Gay Identity, and Gay Identity
Litigation in the 1950s–1970s, 119 YALE L.J. 316, 371 (2009); Kyle C. Velte, Recovering the Race
Analogy in LGBTQ Religious Exemption Cases 42 C ARDOZO L. R EV. 67, 71–74, 85–103 (2020).
15. Important dimensions of the history of legal thinking and practice at the intersections of
race and sex inequality are tracked in Serena Mayeri, The Strange Career of Jane Crow: Sex
Segregation and the Transformation of Anti-Discrimination Discourse, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 187
(2006), and Serena Mayeri, Pauli Murray and the Twentieth-Century Quest for Legal and Social
Equality, 2 IND. J.L. & S OC. EQUAL. 80 (2014). For more sustained treatment, see generally S ERENA
MAYERI , R EASONING FROM R ACE: F EMINISM, LAW , AND THE CIVIL R IGHTS R EVOLUTION (2014), and
DAVID A.J. R ICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE C ASE FOR GAY R IGHTS: R ACE, GENDER, R ELIGION AS
ANALOGIES (1999).
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constitutional mythologies holding that the arc of justice runs from
canonical high-points like Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v.
Virginia to the present day, an era said to be defined by post-racial racial
equity, as the future will be—but without fully reckoning with the raceunequal social conditions that the Court’s colorblind originalist project,
for its part, has wrought. 16
Turning toward the Supreme Court’s foundational pro-LGBTQ
constitutional rights rulings, the Court’s single-axis identity thinking
about race has helped underwrite its pro-LGBTQ constitutional rights
project, but in ways that subtly mark it in intersectional terms—
contingently, not only about LGBTQ identity (chiefly lesbian and gay
identity), but also whiteness, along with cisness and middle-classness, all
elements in the homonormative “white club” that, as far back as the early
1970’s, Sylvia Rivera publicly condemned. 17 Alignments with these
forms of social privilege—and others—have paved the way for LGBTQ
constitutional rights, including the right to marry that Obergefell v.
Hodges announced, to harmonize with, and, at times, to pinkwash,
different kinds of pro-white political efforts—from racial capitalism to
settler colonialism to imperialism to white nationalism—by making it
seem impossible to believe the same Court that would vindicate LGBTQ
rights could likewise vindicate white privilege and white racialized
hierarchies, much less at the same time. 18
16. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
On the marriage project’s rhetoric and its legitimation of post-racial ideology, see generally Russell
K. Robinson, Marriage Equality and Postracialism, 61 UCLA L. R EV. 1010 (2014).
17. On homonormativity, see generally Lisa Dugan, The New Homonormativity: The Sexual
Politics of Neoliberalism, in MATERIALIZING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A R EVITALIZED C ULTURAL
P OLITICS 175 (Russ Castronovo & Dana D. Nelson eds., 2002), and on Sylvia Rivera’s idea of the
“white club,” see Sylvia Rivera, “Y’all Better Quiet Down” Original Authorized Video, 1973 Gay
Pride Rally NYC, YOUTUBE at 04:30 (May 23, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbJIOWUw1o/. For more recent expressions of the general point in the legal academic literature, see,
for example, Russell K. Robinson, Justice Kennedy’s White Nationalism, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. R EV.
1027, 1050–51 (2019), and Russell K. Robinson, Mayor Pete, Obergefell Gays, and White Male
Privilege, 69 B UFF. L. R EV. 296, 317–24 (2021). Related theorizing on homonationalism is found in
JASBIR K. P UAR, TERRORIST ASSEMBLAGES: HOMONATIONALISM IN QUEER TIMES (2007), and Jasbir
Puar, Rethinking Homonationalism, 45 INT. J. MIDDLE EAST S TUD. 336 (2013). For some additional
background on Sylvia Rivera, see Benjamin Shepard, From Community Organization to Direct
Services: The Street Trans Action Revolutionaries to Sylvia Rivera Law Project, 39 J. S OC. S ERV.
R ES. 95, 98–101 (2013)
18. 576 U.S. 644 (2015). For germane and illuminating thoughts on the pinkwashing problem,
see, among other sources, Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs? Toward a Political
Economy of Sexuality, 14 WM. & MARY B ILL R TS. J. 1539 (2006); Che Gossett, Žižek’s Trans/gender
Trouble, L.A. R EV. B OOKS (Sept. 13, 2016), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/zizeks-transgendertrouble/; Robinson, White Male Privilege, supra note 17. Another way to register the pinkwashing
concern is to note how cases like United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), and Obergefell v.
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From the perspective of the lived experiences of LGBTQ people,
however, the Supreme Court’s race and LGBTQ rights doctrines
practically carve up the terrain of LGBTQ people’s constitutional rights
in a fashion that has yielded a distinctive topography. 19 Up on a hill, the
tale is the largely cheery story of pro-LGBTQ constitutional rights
protections and sensibilities whose march has, so far, escaped
originalism’s grip. By contrast, in the valley below, LGBTQ people’s
rights, powerfully shaped by the Court’s anti-pro-Black colorblind
originalism, entail a harder truth of constitutional rollbacks and
constitutionally approved closures of the political space for fomenting
robust and forthrightly pro-Black anti-subordinationist positions—
positions that, in a wide sense, would also vindicate the rights of Black
trans and other Black LGBTQ people.
The constitutional rights that the Court and others still regularly
consider to be “LGBTQ rights” are the constitutional rights up on the hill.
Access to them formally remains open to Black trans and other Black
LGBTQ people—if and when they are like their white, cis, and
socioeconomically at least middle-classed lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
queer sisters and brothers. Notice how this configuration inverts
traditional “like-race” arguments. 20 Whiteness, along with cisness and
class privilege, serve here as the model for LGBTQ constitutional rights
protections, a fact that might be surprising were whiteness not already the
touchstone for the racialized originalist rules that govern in the valley
below, as they govern the remainder of the Court’s race equality
jurisprudence. 21
Nor should it be surprising to anyone that efforts to oppose LGBTQ
constitutional rights and other LGBTQ rights up on the hill have, at times,
Hodges, effectively bracket the history of racialized definitions of marriage, both in the antebellum
South and the Jim Crow era, along with marriage’s and family law’s wider racial inflections, on
which, see, for example, Shani King, The Family Law Canon in a (Post?) Racial Era, 72 OHIO S T.
L.J. 575 (2011).
19. Venturing no simplistic causation claims, certain rough correspondences to this
constitutional topography are found, in different ways, in and as normative structures of sexuality and
sexual desire operative “inside” LGBTQ communities, on which consider Russell K. Robinson &
David M. Frost, LGBTQ Equality and Sexual Racism, 86 F ORDHAM L. REV. 2739 (2018). For a classic
variation of the hill/valley imagery in other terms and in another context, see Yale Kamisar, Equal
Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in C RIMINAL JUSTICE IN
OUR TIME 1 (1965).
20. Along these lines, consider the argument detailed in Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the
Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. R EV. 1789 (2008).
21. This is not derived from Darren Hutchinson’s “inversion thesis,” but that thesis nevertheless
provides a helpful framework for understanding the constitutional topography being described here.
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”: The Inversion of
Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 3 U. ILL. L. R EV. 615 (2003).
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been driven by attempts, sometimes subtle, sometimes not, to pull those
rights toward, or to hold them in, the valley below by racializing them, as
though they could properly be marred into legal non-recognition by
imputations of certain kinds of Blackness.
One such effort that constructs LGBTQ rights in racialized terms,
thus marking them as intersectional rights, but in ways that cast doubt
upon them, appeared in Bostock v. Clayton County, the case announcing
that anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination are forms of sex discrimination
prohibited by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 22 While Bostock is,
by its own terms, a statutory interpretation decision, the majority opinion
in the case, in a deep sense, conforms to, and draws supports from, the
Court’s pro-LGBTQ constitutional rights jurisprudence. 23
A series of notable anti-gay and anti-trans arguments in Bostock—of
keen interest to those concerned with queer Black trans politics—focused
on the pro-trans Title VII anti-discrimination claim in one of the cases
Bostock collects, Aimee Stephens’s sex discrimination case against her
former employer, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which
discriminated against her because she was trans. 24 Pro-defense arguments
in this case traded in ideologically saturated stereotypes about trans people
as part of positions urging the Court to deny trans people statutory sex
discrimination rights, suggesting that trans people—and specifically trans
women—posed imminent sexual threats to cisheterosexual women
(described simply as “women” in these accounts). Pro-defense briefing
and oral arguments in Stephens’s case repeatedly involved trans women
being misgendered and maligned by positions that depressingly
reproduced familiar anti-trans cultural scripts that figure trans people, and
trans women more particularly, fantastically and wholly unsupported by
any facts, as sexual monsters who do and would do terrible and sexually
injurious things to women in showers and locker rooms if only given the
chance. The idea here was that a pro-trans ruling in Stephens’s case would

22. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
23. Marc Spindelman, Bostock’s Paradox: Textualism, Legal Justice, and the Constitution, 69
B UFF. L. R EV. 553 (2021).
24. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018); aff’d
sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). The anti-trans arguments
in Stephens’s case are traced in detail in Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: An Essay on the
Supreme Court’s LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, 82 OHIO S T. L.J. ONLINE 128 (2021). For
linkages to bathroom debates that have arisen within “anti trans lawfare,” see Gossett, supra note 18.
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do just that by providing the occasion for these abuses as a matter of
legally protected civil rights. 25
These anti-trans positions did not expressly center race. What was
evident, however, to anyone broadly familiar with the U.S. cultural
archive, including its genealogies of sexual violence, was that the antitrans fantasies circulating in Bostock drew their rhetorical form and power
from fantastical and malignant slaver misrepresentations of AfricanAmerican men, noxiously figured, consistent with “colonial racialization
. . . [and] mythologization,” as sexually irrepressible beasts who pose an
ever-present threat to white women in ways that warrant—even
demand—vigilant and subordinating collective responses. 26
The anti-trans fantasies at work in Bostock—themselves unhinged
and group-based projections, which, on one understanding, tacitly figured
Black trans women as intersectionally personifying their anti-trans
concerns—were, as in historical white supremacist anti-Black discourses,
the conjurings of white and, apparently, cisheterosexual men. Sourcing
aside, the cultural imperatives of these fantasies of sexual violence
exceeded the seemingly measured calls for the Court to deny that antitrans discrimination was prohibited sex discrimination under federal
law. 27 Beyond that, these imaginary spectacles of violence stretched
toward enjoining the state to respond to the looming, racialized trans
menace through its monopoly on legitimate violence, deploying
criminalization, policing, and punishment, to stop it. Curiously, it was not
those responses so much as another that pro-defense arguments focused
on. Here, one notable thought was that the looming trans menace should
be handled by handing trans people back over to the psychiatric
professions, the asylum being more apt as social management response
than affording trans people sex discrimination protections under law. 28
25. Trans monstrosity is discussed and reclaimed, transvalued, in Susan Stryker, My Words to
Victor Frankenstein Above the Village of Chamounix: Performing Transgender Rage, in THE
TRANSGENDER S TUDIES R EADER 244, 245–47, 254 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006).
26. Che Gossett, Blackness and the Trouble of Trans Visibility, in TRAP DOOR: TRANS
C ULTURAL P RODUCTION AND THE P OLITICS OF VISIBILITY 183, 187 (Reina Gossett, Eric A. Stanley,
& Johanna Burton eds., 2017). See also, e.g., Crenshaw, Close Encounters, supra note 12, at 184–88;
Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE
J.L. & F EMINISM 13, 19, 22 (1991). On the relation of some of these ideas to slaver outlooks, see
James Baldwin, A Talk to Teachers, in C OLLECTED ESSAYS 678, 681–82 (1998). This is not to make
any general point here, though it does raise questions about some conservative approaches that seek
to protect white ciswomanhood and their racial inflections.
27. For discussion, see Spindelman, The Shower’s Return, supra note 24, at 160–73.
28. Id. The racial resonances and underpinnings of the anti-trans fantasies that surfaced in
Bostock suggested not only why statutory sex discrimination protections were appropriate, and
needed, but also why, in theory, statutory race discrimination protections might have been argued for
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Happily, the anti-trans efforts in Bostock did not succeed. This is not
exactly to say that they failed—or were defeated outright. Bostock
nowhere openly engaged these arguments to discredit them. Instead,
Bostock set the arguments focused on trans women in showers and locker
rooms to one side as matters for another day. 29 Leaving the possibilities
for their return open this way, if and when they do come back, as seems
likely, what the Court will make of them may, like Bostock, turn on the
status at that point of the Court’s LGBTQ constitutional rights decisions—
the cases up on the hill—and whether, by then, the Court’s originalist
project will have driven all LGBTQ people’s constitutional rights into the
valley below through a new constitutional originalist jurisprudence that
broadly flattens out the wider topography of LGBTQ rights. 30
II. QUEER BLACK TRANS POLITICS IN THE ABORTION RIGHTS SETTING
Thinking with queer Black trans politics also reconfigures
widespread legal and popular understandings of the stakes of the
originalist challenges that have dominated the Dobbs litigation, now
focused less on its constitutional challenge to Mississippi’s fifteen-week
abortion ban than on Mississippi’s pro-life originalist defense of that law,
grounded in an originalist take-down of Roe, Casey, and the abortion right

as an alternative statutory ground of support for the trans rights claims involved in the case, and
perhaps the lesbian and gay rights claims argued for in it, as well. To the extent that historical forms
of white supremacy and anti-Blackness determine trans people’s rights—or lesbian women’s or gay
men’s or other people’s rights—they might be understood to be part of the protean ways that racial
hierarchy reproduces itself, including how it intersects with other supremacist ideologies, including
cisheterosexism. Race equality tools like Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination could thus be
marshalled against them.
29. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753.
30. Part of what makes this seem likely is the ongoing anti-trans lawfare unfolding in real-time,
including measures focused on trans women in sport, see ACLU, Legislation Affecting LGBTQ Rights
Across the Country, Sec.(c), https://www.aclu.org/legislation-affecting-lgbtq-rights-acros s country/ (Feb. 25, 2022), and other anti-trans political efforts, including Texas’s showing involving
child abuse claims, on which, see, for example, J. David Goodman & Amanda Morris, Texas
Investigates Parents Over Care for Transgender Youth, Suit Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/01/us/texas-child-abuse-trans-youth.html/, and
J.
David
Goodman, Texas Court Halts Abuse Inquiries into Parents of Transgender Children, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 11, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/11/us/texas-transgender-child-abuse.html/, not
to overlook sometimes related anti-gay political efforts, like Florida’s so-called “Don’t Say Gay ”
measure, Ana Ceballos & Kirby Wilson, Student Voices are Loud, But Florida Republicans are Clear.
“Don’t Say Gay” Bill Passes, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 8, 2022), available at https://www.arcamax
.com/currentnews/newsheadlines/s-2644732, presently being copied in other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Peter Greene, Not Just Florida. How “Don’t Say Gay” Legislation Compares in Other States,
F ORBES. COM (Apr. 14, 2022), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petergreene/2022/04/14/not-just-floridahow-dont-say-gay-legislation-compares-in-other-states/.
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they protect. In this setting, originalism has practical repercussions for
legal protections covering sex equality, as well.
Conventionally, the constitutional abortion right encodes liberty
figured as belonging to cisgender, and, more exactly, cisheterosexual,
women, largely on the supposition that the pregnancies that abortions end
result from sex these women had with cisheterosexual men. Within this
sex-binaristic and cisheterosexualized matrix, the constitutional abortion
right implicates cisheterosexual women’s equality with cisheterosexual
men, and hence sex equality in a wider sense, at least as a function of
abortion’s social and political meanings, if not how it has been
consecrated in constitutional doctrine, chiefly on privacy or liberty
rationales. 31
If not self-evident, the whiteness of the cisheterosexualized
constitutional abortion right, along with its relative class locations come
into focus by attending to Roe’s simultaneous rhetorical foregrounding
and legal backgrounding of cisheterosexual women in the course of
announcing the constitutional abortion right. 32 The abortion right that Roe
31. Reflections on sex equality under law, including treatment of sex, pregnancy, and abortion,
are in Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991).
The Casey joint opinion set down tracks connecting the abortion right, as an expression of Fourteenth
Amendment liberty, to the prospects of affirming it as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment sex equality
guarantees in Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, 856, 860–69, 887–98 (majority opinion), further observations
on which are in Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 171–72 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Speaking intersectionally, there are other legal prospects for giving abortion and other forms of
reproductive rights a home in the Constitution’s text, including one possibility breaking in Brief for
Constitutional Law Scholars, Catharine A. MacKinnon et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants,
Virginia v. Ferriero, No. 21-5096 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 10, 2022). Also worth noting here is how faithful
pro-life work against constitutional abortion protections is itself deeply invested in
cisheterosexualized understandings of womanhood and “motherhood.” Conservative religious prochoice positions have, at times, been reactive and responsive to those kinds of claims, though,
candidly, pro-choice commitments do also at times have their own independent commitments to
thinking in traditional heterosexualized and gender binaristic terms.
32. Reflections on some dimensions of the journey reproductive justice movements have been
on toward full inclusion are in R EPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE B RIEFING B OOK: A P RIMER ON
R EPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND S OCIAL C HANGE (2007), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/phpprograms/courses/fileDL.php?fID=4051/. See also generally Loretta Ross, What Is Reproductive
Justice?, in id. at 4. On LGBTQ inclusion see, for example, Alisa Wellek & Miriam Yeung,
Reproductive Justice and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Liberation, in id., at 18;
NATIONAL LGBTQ TASK F ORCE, QUEERING R EPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: A TOOLKIT (Zsea Beaumonis,
Candace Bond-Theriault, Stacey Long Simons, & Sabrina Rewald eds., 2017),
https://www.thetaskforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Queering-Reproductive-Justice-AToolkit-FINAL.pdf. On trans inclusivity more particularly, see also id. at 35–37, and Naomhán
O’Connor, Framing Reproductive Justice in the Context of Institutionalized Transphobia Globally,
S EXUAL AND R EPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS, http://www.srhm.org/news/framing-reproductivejustice-in-the-context-of-institutionalized-transphobia-globally/. Thanks to Angela Harris for
engagement on this point.
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announced, specifying the generalized constitutional right to privacy
earlier cases recognized, placed the abortion decision first, foremost, and
directly not in pregnant cisheterosexual women’s hands, but in the hands
of their physicians, said to have the right to end unwanted pregnancies in
consultation with their patients, free from undue state interference. 33 At
the time of Roe’s announcement, those physicians were overwhelmingly
white, cisheterosexual men with professional prestige and socioeconomic power. 34 Later abortion cases, including the public funding
cases and Casey, differently crystallized Roe’s and the abortion right’s
class dimensions, making it clear the right was for those who had the
means to access it, even as the Court clarified that the right belonged to
pregnant women, for whom it was more robust the more they conformed
to heteronormative ideals, like marriage, themselves deeply, though
obviously not categorically, racially marked as white. 35
Understanding the racialized, cisheterosexualized, and classed
dimensions of the constitutional abortion right, and having a sense of how
those features have persisted across time, illuminate a significant
dimension of the pro-choice litigation strategy in Dobbs. A collection of
pro-choice arguments in the case—by lawyers representing Jackson
Women’s Health Organization and amici supporting its position—urged
33. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–66. But see id. at 113. The earlier cases are Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See also Susan
Frelich Appleton, Doctors, Patients, and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician’s
Role in “Private” Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 183 (1985).
34. For the notation that “[i]n the first generation after Roe, abortion providers were mostly
men because doctors were mostly men,” something that has since changed, so that women “are now
the main force behind providing abortion,” see Emily Bazelon, The New Abortion Providers, N.Y.
TIMES
(July
14,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/magazine/18abortiont.html?referringSource=articleShare/. See also C.E. Joffe, T.A. Weitz, & C.L. Stacey, Uneasy Allies:
Pro-Choice Physicians, Feminist Health Activists and the Struggle for Abortion Rights, 26 S OCIO.
HEALTH & WELLNESS 775, 788 (2004).
35. On abortion funding, see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980). On the Casey point, compare Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881–
87 (1992) (plurality opinion), with id. at 887–98 (majority opinion). For an important overview of
how family law privileges whiteness, see generally King, supra note 18, and for an engagement with
how “marriage as an institution” has “worked in ways that primarily served to marry African
Americans—those who are married, as well as those who are not—to second class citizenship,” see
R.A. Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry, 84 F ORDHAM L. R EV. 53, 58 (2015). These
features of marriage are both in contrast to, and, differently, continuous with, “[a]ntebellum social
rules and laws [that] considered enslaved people morally and legally unfit to marry,” and
“incapacitated [them] from entering into civil contracts of which marriage was one.” Katherine M.
Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11
YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 251, 252 (1999). It is additionally worth recognizing how the racial
markings of the abortion right work through silence about who has exercised the right—and who,
given the demographics of exercising the abortion right, is disproportionately affected by abortion
restrictions.
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the Court to reaffirm Roe and Casey by showing how bad a contrary result
would be for cis women from all walks of life. 36 These arguments
variously presented the abortion right as a lived intersectional right
through socio-legal accounts of what the right means for cis women from
different socially disadvantaged groups, prominently including groups
defined by race, ethnicity, national origin, immigration status, age,
disability, class, and “sexual minority” status. 37 A number of these
arguments surfaced in amicus briefs that further inflected intersectionally,
cross-indexing the social identities they spotlighted with other forms of
social inequality pregnant people live, including in relation to abortion. 38
As to “sexual minority” cisgender women, the most important
amicus brief was filed by a number of LGBTQ organizations and
prominent LGBTQ advocates. 39 This LGBTQ organizations and
advocates brief resurfaces older LGBTQ traditions understanding
reproductive justice as an LGBTQ issue while productively indicating

36. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 37, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct.
422 (2021) (No. 19-1392); Brief of 547 Deans, Chairs, Scholars and Public Health Professionals, as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 15–16, 142 S. Ct. 422 (No. 19-1392); Brief of National
Women’s Law Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7, 142 S. Ct. 422 (No. 19-1392);
Brief of Legal Voice as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, 11–16, 142 S. Ct. 422 (No. 191392); Brief of YWCA USA as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7–13, 142 S. Ct. 422 (No.
19-1392); Brief for Organizations Dedicated to the Fight for Reproductive Justice—Mississippi in
Action as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9–39, 142 S. Ct. 422 (No. 19-1392). The
intersectional arguments for abortion rights harken to older feminist traditions, not followed in Roe,
as described in Melissa Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice, Racial Justice, and the Battle
for Roe v. Wade, 134 HARV. L. R EV. 2025, 2048–49 (2021) (discussing Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp.
800 (D. Conn. 1972)).
37. In addition to the briefs cited supra note 36, see also generally, for example, Brief of
Campaña Nacional Por el Aborto Libre, Seguro, y Accesible as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 422 (2021) (No. 19-1392); Brief
for LGBTQ Organizations and Advocates as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 422 (2021) (No. 19-1392); Brief of National Asian Pacific
American Women’s Forum as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s
Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 422 (No. 19-1392); Brief of Advocates for Youth, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Respondents, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 422 (No. 19-1392);
Brief of the Autistic Self Advocacy Network as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Dobbs
v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 422 (No. 19-1392). There can be little doubt that larger
strategic thoughts were in play in these framings.
38. See, e.g., Brief of Legal Voice, supra note 36, at 4–5; Brief of YWCA USA, supra note 36,
at 11–13, 16–19, 23–24, 29–30, 32–35; Brief for Organizations Dedicated to the Fight for
Reproductive Justice, supra note 36, at 1–2, 3–5. Beyond these Dobbs briefs, see also generally
Murray, supra note 36; Michele Goodwin, Banning Abortion Doesn’t Protect Women’s Health, N.Y.
TIMES (July 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/09/opinion/roe-abortion-supremecourt.html/.
39. Brief for LGBTQ Organizations and Advocates, supra note 37.

108

C ONLAW NOW

[13:93

abortion does not involve only cisheterosexual women’s rights. 40 Thus,
the brief notes that sexual minority women, too, can and do become
pregnant via intercourse with cisgender men, though neither the
intercourse nor the pregnancies that result are always consensual or
wanted. 41 Focusing on sexual minority women’s experiences with sexual
violence and injury, the brief explains abortion is sometimes necessary to
limit the consequences of sexual abuse, giving sexual minority victims
and survivors back some control over their bodies and futures, instead of
compounding harms they suffer by forcing them to carry pregnancies to
term against their will. 42 Along other lines, the brief shows abortion rights
are important to sexual minority women who face economic and other
social barriers to good contraceptive care, which put them at risk of
unwanted pregnancies. 43 As to both these points, the brief thickens its
arguments by talking about “sexual minority” cis women who experience
other forms of social inequality in their lives, showing how diverse
LGBTQ communities are, even just among those who could become
pregnant. Among other facets of LGBTQ life, the brief distinctively
engages the reproductive realities faced by Black, poor, young, trans, as
well as non-binary “sexual minority” people who might need—and should
have—the constitutional abortion right. 44
Without singularly centering Black trans people and their
experiences with sex, contraception, healthcare, pregnancy, and the
reproductive freedoms that they do and do not enjoy, the LGBTQ
organizations and advocates brief holds important space for them and thus
affirms what queer Black trans politics also understand: The depiction of
abortion rights as about white, cisheterosexual, and socioeconomically
privileged people registers only a part of a larger social picture. Though
the abortion right was forged around cisheterosexual women and other
kinds of social privilege, LGBTQ people do rely on it, hardly without
challenge, as with other forms of healthcare LGBTQ people need. As
such, it has become a right that LGBTQ people need and use—and in that
sense at least, abortion is an LGBTQ right.
Thus, Dobbs—a case about the right of pregnant people to end
unwanted pregnancies—is also an LGBTQ rights case. If and when Dobbs
40. Reminders of this tradition are in URVASHI VAID, IRRESISTIBLE R EVOLUTION:
C ONFRONTING R ACE, C LASS, AND THE ASSUMPTIONS OF LGBT P OLITICS 4, 41, 63, 122, 136, 139,
142, 172 (2012).
41. Brief for LGBTQ Organizations and Advocates, supra note 37, at 19–23.
42. Id. at 21–23.
43. Id. at 23–25.
44. See id. at 16 n.2, 20–27.
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overturns or shrinks Roe and Casey, it will, in and of itself, diminish the
rights of pregnant people outside, but also inside, LGBTQ communities.
As Kierra Johnson, Executive Director of the National LGBTQ Task
Force, put it in a public statement addressed to LGBTQ communities the
day that Dobbs was argued:
If you think this decision will not affect you, think again: a wrong
decision by the Supreme Court means you, too, will lose your bodily
autonomy, your ability to own your own personal and community
power. This is not just about abortion; it is about controlling bodies
based on someone else determining your worthiness. This is a racial
justice issue. This is a women’s issue. It is an LGBTQ issue. It is a civil
rights issue. These are our fundamental rights that are at stake. 45

Johnson’s statement understandably frames Dobbs’ immediate
danger to LGBTQ people in broad terms—terms that emphasize “bodily
autonomy” and self-control, in order to make its case to LGBTQ publics
who need to hear its message. But what it says is more narrowly true just
as to the abortion right itself. That right—hence Dobbs—involves racial
justice, women’s equality, and LGBTQ rights, and it does so all at once.
The statement’s stance bespeaks intersectionality this way, though it is
articulated so that even non-intersectionality-savvy LGBTQ audiences
can hear it. If the Court’s originalist project comes for Roe and Casey and
the constitutional abortion right in Dobbs, it will come for the lived rights,
freedom, and equality of people in all these groups—groups that are
themselves interconnected partly by virtue of the people who make them
up, including Black trans people and Black cis lesbian, bisexual, and other
sexually identified queer women.
What all this means is that Dobbs’ impact on LGBTQ people’s
constitutional rights is not only off at a distance, as many still think—
about, say, what Dobbs will or will not do to undermine the foundations
of LGBTQ constitutional rights up on that hill, or what Dobbs will or will
not mean, down the road, for continued recognition of that same group of
rights. Dobbs does raise those questions, to be sure, but its impact on
45. SCOTUS Reaction Statement from Task Force Executive Director, Kierra Johnson,
NATIONAL LGBTQ TASK F ORCE (Dec. 1, 2021), https://www.thetaskforce.org/scotus-reactio nstatement-from-task-force-executive-director-kierra-johnson/. For discussion elsewhere crossilluminating the intersectional commitments of Johnson’s “reaction statement,” see Kierra Johnson,
Queer Rights Are Reproductive Rights & Repro Rights Are Queer Rights, LGBTQ NATION (Sept. 30,
2021), https://www.lgbtqnation.com/2021/09/queer-rights-reproductive-rights-repro-rights-queerrights/. For context detailing Johnson’s role as “[a] longtime leader” in the reproductive justice
movement, see Becca Damante, Kierra Johnson Redefines the Movement for the National LGBTQ
Task Force, TAGG MAG. (Mar. 15, 2021), https://taggmagazine.com/kierra-johnson-national-lgbtqtask-force/.
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LGBTQ rights, however it is decided, will be more direct and immediate
than that—along just the lines Johnson’s statement describes. To fail to
recognize this is to fail to recognize what liberty and equality mean for
LGBTQ people who are or who may become pregnant. It misunderstands
who LGBTQ people are—and what LGBTQ people need to be free.
Viewed critically and aligned with queer Black trans politicsinspired realism, if one begins with an appreciation for the racial logics of
the Court’s colorblind originalism, the pro-choice litigation strategy in
Dobbs—highlighting abortion’s meaning to different kinds of pregnant
people—involved a long-term strategic play. It might not move a single
conservative Supreme Court justice committed to a pro-life originalism in
Dobbs into the pro-Roe or pro-Casey column (though who knows?), but
the strategy could easily inform dissents in Dobbs that will sow the seeds
of future doctrinal innovations re-establishing abortion protections in their
lived intersectional realities, a new Roe for a new day. In other directions,
the pro-choice intersectionality strategy in Dobbs speaks the lived truths
of the abortion right in a way that advertises the practices of, and the
ongoing need for, a broad political vision of reproductive justice that,
going forward, is ready to underwrite intersectional reproductive rights
protections, and in ways that may reshape local, state, and even national
U.S. politics. 46
Doctrinally, the pro-choice intersectionality strategy in Dobbs may
already have helped draw out its own form of unintended dialectical
resistance—one that syncs the Court’s treatment of the abortion right with
the broad, rights-denying impulses of the Court’s ostensibly colorblind
originalism. During oral arguments in Dobbs, Justice Clarence Thomas
repeatedly invoked—seemingly approvingly—“a case out of South
Carolina . . . [that] involved a woman who had been convicted of criminal
child neglect because she ingested cocaine during pregnancy.” 47

46. See, e.g., Abortion Is a Reproductive Issue for Black Families and Communities, NATIONAL
B IRTH EQUITY C OLLABORATIVE, https://birthequity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/NBEC_RJ2.0
_FINAL-NYT-ad_REVISED.pdf. For another prophetic account of reproductive justice that offers
reflections on different ways to meet the present moment, see Robin West, From Choice to
Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394 (2009). Of course,
there are alienating risks in this setting as well.
47. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 49, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct.
422 (2021) (No. 19-1392). For additional engagement, see id. at 49–50, 103–04. Cf. Whitner v. State,
492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997). But cf. also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
Important context for Justice Thomas’ views on abortion and race, sometimes inflected in dialectic
terms, is offered by Murray, supra note 36. See especially id. at 2029–30, 2052, 2057–59, 2071, 2083–
2101. See also Corey Robin, Clarence Thomas’s Radical Vision of Race, NEW YORKER (Sept. 10,
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/essay/clarence-thomass-radical-vision-of-race/.
For
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Read in terms of political geography that meets both pro-life politics
and the racialized war on drugs head-on, Justice Thomas’s questions
raised the prospect that pro-life originalist approval of abortion bans may
soon start blessing other forms of criminal-law-based state management
of pregnant people generally, but with a distinctive “colorblind” eye on
Black women’s mind-bodies and lives. 48 Consistent with pro-life logics
that, in racial terms, trace racial capitalist histories to human reproduction
during the long era of U.S. slavery, both as an effect and a cause of
racialized wealth, it is possible that Dobbs will practically open the door
for treating Black cis women’s and Black trans people’s and other
women’s bodies as forms of public commons that are to be managed and
overseen by the state, backed by the imprimatur of the Constitution as
defined by the Supreme Court. 49 So much for the Civil War Amendments
and their original, grand promises of freedom and self-possession—and
originalism’s own claims to historical objectivity and political
neutrality. 50 It is no comfort that all pregnant women—and other pregnant
people—may be treated the same way, consistent with constitutional
equality demands.

more from Justice Thomas himself on race and abortion, see Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana
and Kentucky, Inc., 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1782 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
48. On race and the war on drugs, see, for example, MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
C ROW : MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF C OLORBLINDNESS 1–7, 47–53, 59–62 (2010). On
racialized state control of reproduction, see generally, for example, MICHELE GOODWIN, P OLICING
THE WOMB: INVISIBLE WOMEN AND THE C RIMINALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD 114–48 (2020), and
DOROTHY R OBERTS, KILLING THE B LACK B ODY: R ACE, R EPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF
LIBERTY 150–245 (1997). See also Aziza Ahmed & Michele Goodwin, Coercing Rape Survivors to
Be Pregnant for the State—The Texas Way, MS. MAGAZINE (Oct. 1, 2021),
https://msmagazine.com/2021/10/01/texas-abortion-ban-rape-exception-greg-abbott-crime-control/;
Michele Goodwin & Mary Ziegler, Whatever Happened to the Exceptions for Rape and Incest, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 29, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/11/abortion-lawexceptions-rape-and-incest/620812/.
49. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 36, at 2033–34; see also, e.g., R OBERTS, supra note 48, at 24–
31. For related treatment spotlighting incarcerated women from within “a robust legal framework,
informed by the principles of reproductive justice,” see Priscilla Ocen, Incapacitating Motherhood,
51 U.C. DAVIS L. R EV. 2191 (2018).
50. Then again, anti-Black readings of “constitutional guarantees of Black citizenship” entailed
in the Civil War Amendments have their own history. One recent notation is in Joseph Fishkin &
William E. Forbath, How Progressives Can Take Back the Constitution, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 8,
2022),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/02/progressives-constitution-oligarch yfishkin-forbath/621614/. As Fishkin and Forbath observe: “By the turn of the 20th century, the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to intervene to enforce constitutional guarantees of Black citizenship, even in
the face of openly illegal mass disenfranchisement and white political violence. All three branches of
the federal government had abandoned the promises of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments.” Id.
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III. WHEN CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM MEETS THE COURT’S
PRO-LGBTQ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DECISIONS ON THE HILL
As important as everything to this point has been—and is—on its
own terms, it is all also useful in producing a new set of critical
understandings of what a pro-life constitutional originalist decision in
Dobbs might mean for and do to those constitutional LGBTQ rights
decisions on the hill that have been in the same Fourteenth Amendment
liberty family as Roe and Casey. These new understandings are not only
fostered by, but they also have implications for, queer Black trans politics
and how they circulate in LGBTQ communities in the shorter and longer
term.
While there are different ways to thread the originalist needle, from
the point of view that I have been developing—recognizing what the
Court’s constitutional originalism has meant for race equality and what it
may soon mean for sex equality—it looks like the Court’s originalist
project already has LGBTQ people’s constitutional rights in its sights. The
wonder here is not what Dobbs may soon mean for LGBTQ rights
generally, but what it may mean for those other LGBTQ rights up on that
hill, and how, in principle, they could be treated any differently.
At this juncture, it is worth returning to Bostock and glimpsing its
presumably unintended underbelly. Maligned by a number of
conservatives as an act of textualist interpretive infidelity and sometimes
also as an act of pro-gay and pro-trans political treason, Justice Neil
Gorsuch’s Bostock opinion has been welcomed in many pro-LGBTQ and
feminist circles as a case that, at long last, without saying so in so many
words, has recognized the tight, unbreakable social link forged inside
male supremacist ideologies between and among sexism, anti-gay, and
anti-trans discrimination. 51 Whether seen in terms of progressive
51. For criticisms of Bostock’s textualist method from other pro-textualist positions, see, for
example, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1755–75 (Alito, J., dissenting), and Nelson Lund, Unleashed and
Unbound: Living Textualism in Bostock v. Clayton County, 21 F EDERALIST S OC’Y R EV. 158 (2020).
Reporting on the political critique includes Robert Barnes, Neil Gorsuch? The Surprise Behind the
Supreme Court’s Surprising LGBTQ Decision, WASH. P OST (June 16, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/neil-gorsuch-gay-transgender-rights-supremecourt/2020/06/16/112f903c-afe3-11ea-8f56-63f38c990077_story.html/;
Jane Coaston, Social
Conservatives Feel Betrayed by the Supreme Court—and the GOP That Appointed It, VOX. COM (Jul
1, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/7/1/21293370/supreme-court-conservatism-bostock-lgbtq republicans/. See also 166 C ONG. R EC. S2998–3000 (daily ed. June 16, 2020) (statement of Sen. Josh
Hawley). For some analysis of whether Bostock can properly be counted as feminist, see Ann C.
McGinley et al., Feminist Perspectives on Bostock v. Clayton County, 53 C ONN. L. R EV. ONLINE 1
(2020). On male supremacy’s treatment of anti-gay discrimination, see ANDREA DWORKIN,
P ORNOGRAPHY: MEN P OSSESSING WOMEN 60–61 (1989), ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 191–
98 (1987); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
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understandings of the case or in its own formalist terms, however, Bostock
may prove to have boomerang-like tendencies. Without any significant
conceptual effort, Bostock can readily be redeployed as a legal device for
translating an originalist set-back to the abortion right in Dobbs, itself,
practically, a set-back to sex equality rights, into other sex-based
originalist losses—losses that may limit or likewise unwind LGBTQ
victories in cases like Lawrence v. Texas and Obergefell v. Hodges. 52
This prospect presents a new way to apprehend Bostock’s curious, if
careful, avoidance of any express mention, much less engaged discussion,
of the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBTQ constitutional decisions up on the
hill—no matter how those decisions underwrite and structure its sense of
what legal justice required in the case. 53 It is, frankly, hard to conceive of
Bostock as a legal long-con by a mustachios-twisting textualist/originalist
justice who secretly and strategically cast homophobia and transphobia as
sexism in Bostock in order to prefigure an alley-oop after a case like
Dobbs that would turn this pro-LGBTQ textualist victory into authority
for subsequent anti-LGBTQ constitutional originalist defeats. Intentions
aside, Bostock’s capacity for redeployment as authority for overturning
the Court’s pro-LGBTQ constitutional rights decisions after Dobbs is now
impossible to miss. If and when the moves are formally placed upon the
table, even Justice Gorsuch could conceivably join. The explanation
might be that nothing in Bostock anyway committed him to upholding the
Court’s pro-LGBTQ constitutional rights decisions. 54 (“See? I didn’t even
cite them!”)
While such a ruling would be at odds with more straightforward
understandings of Bostock’s letter and spirit, it is the kind of turn-about
that a long view of the Court’s so-called colorblind originalism—like the
kind of critical perspective that queer Black trans politics helps to tee up—
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 197 (1994). On how anti-trans discrimination fits in, see, for
example, John Stoltenberg, Andrea Dworkin Was a Trans Ally, B OSTON R EV. (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://bostonreview.net/articles/john-stoltenberg-andrew-dworkin-was-trans-ally/.
Additional
sources in the context of a larger argument about sex equality and gay men are in Marc Spindelman,
Gay Men and Sex Equality, 46 TULSA L. R EV. 123, 131 n.27 (2013).
52. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
53. The argument of how the Court’s pro-LGBTQ constitutional decisions underwrite and
structure Bostock is detailed in Spindelman, Bostock’s Paradox, supra note 23. Bostock also broadly
avoids any deep, express engagement with ideas about sex stereotyping beyond its textualist sex
formalism. For a critical account of Bostock’s on these grounds, see Anthony Michael Kreis, Unlawful
Genders, 85 LAW & C ONTEMP. P ROBS. 103 (2022).
54. An explanation for why, in principle, Bostock drives toward reaffirming, not rolling back,
much less erasing, Roe and Casey in Dobbs is found in Marc Spindelman, Justice Gorsuch’s Choice:
From Bostock v. Clayton County to Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 13
C ONLAW NOW 11 (2021).
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might anticipate. Settled judgments about constitutional and legal
protections, after all, rise and fall, and when they fall, they not
uncommonly do so through sometimes clever, if also highly dubious
means. Across the sweep of U.S. history, pro-white and anti-Black
racialized forms of individual and institutional power have demonstrated
stunning talents for scanning a political/legal situation and sensing how
anti-racist and pro-Black power formations are in play and at work—in
order to move to thwart them.
Note in this light the possible stakes of LGBTQ communities getting
sharper and more aggressive in their anti-racist and anti-whitesupremacist alignments and commitments. 55 The more that LGBTQ
communities proudly stand to be counted as part of what has, at times,
disparagingly been termed the “Great Awokening,” a term that itself calls
out to be queered, the greater the chances that LGBTQ rights will come
under fire from that colorblind originalist project that has done so much
to constrict race equality rights, elements of the lived, intersectional rights
of Black trans and non-trans LGBTQ people. 56 If this process holds to
pattern, including as expected on the abortion right front, even those
LGBTQ rights on the hill could be sent down to the valley of rights. From
there, they would presumably be returned to the arena of ordinary politics,
subject, once again, to surveillance and management by new iterations of
old forms of religious and moral anti-LGBTQ opposition that, in the past,
sought to order and control them by placing them under the overlapping
strictures of religious, moral, legal, medical, and socio-cultural
domination. What other futures might life in the valley of LGBTQ rights
hold in store? What additional, constitutionally approved constraints
might limit chances of getting free of them?
For now, anyway, the Supreme Court’s pro-LGBTQ constitutional
rights jurisprudence, comprised of those cases up on the hill, does seem
basically secure enough. Notwithstanding how a pro-life originalist
decision in Dobbs will weaken its foundations, the Court’s pro-LGBTQ
rights jurisprudence may hold, escaping a wholesale reversal by the
55. Public indications of this movement and these commitments are set forth in LGBTQ
Organizations Unite to Combat Racial Violence, HUMAN R IGHTS C AMPAIGN,
https://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/LGBTQ_Organizations_Unite_to_Combat_Racial_Viol
ence.pdf. See also Elizabeth Bibi, The Human Rights Campaign and 100+ LGBTQ Organizations
Release
Letter
Condemning
Racial
Violence,
HRC. ORG
(May
29,
2020),
https://www.hrc.org/news/hrc-and-75-lgbtq-organizations-release-letter-cond emning-racistviolence/.
56. On the “Great Awokening,” see, for example, Matthew Yglesias, The Great Awokening,
VOX. COM (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/22/18259865/great-awokening-whiteliberals-race-polling-trump-2020/.
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Court’s aggressive, activist originalism. Mississippi’s pro-life originalist
positions in Dobbs indicated that that is where Mississippi’s lawyers
thought the Supreme Court stood on the question. Bare-knuckled as
Mississippi’s pro-life originalist politics were—whaling on Roe and
Casey for their non-originalism, said to be sufficient to overturn them—
the state pulled its punches where non-originalist pro-LGBTQ
constitutional rights decisions like Lawrence and Obergefell were
concerned. 57
On one view, this was not merely Mississippi ably counting to five.
In a deeper sense, it was about how vote counting on the ongoing
constitutional status of LGBTQ rights up on the hill involves the status of
a constitutional compromise realignment and re-grounding of LGBTQ
constitutional rights first announced by the Supreme Court Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission ruling, Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s swansong opinion on his signature jurisprudential issue of
LGBTQ constitutional rights. 58 Needless to say, this focus on these
LGBTQ constitutional rights and how their preservation will shape Justice
Kennedy’s historical legacy stands at a striking distance from a decision
in Masterpiece Cakeshop centered on or around Black trans lives—or
rights.
Many have treated Masterpiece Cakeshop as a narrow, shallow, and
modest ruling of no great constitutional moment. Subsequent
developments have helped clarify this reading is wish fulfillment—not
what the opinion is or does, but what some of its pro-LGBTQ readers
might like it to mean. 59 Masterpiece Cakeshop instead quietly produced a
highly significant shift in the Court’s basic conceptualization of, and
approach to, LGBTQ constitutional rights up on the hill. It lifted them up
in order to set them back down on different constitutional foundations.
The Court’s early pro-LGBTQ constitutional rights decisions
evolved through rulings in which the Court generally treated lesbian and
gay rights as emerging within a politically liberal, or perhaps more
precisely, a politically libertarian, constitutional tradition and order. In it,
religious and moral views on homosexuality and same-sex relationships,
including marriage, had—and were declared to have—no legitimate role
to play in setting state policy on the prospects of, and for, LGBTQ life.
Religious and moral views opposing LGBTQ people and their rights were
57. Compare Brief for Petitioners at 18, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., No. 19-1392
(July 22, 2021), with id. at 17, for the pulled punches.
58. 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
59. An assessment of these possibilities and citations to some relevant sources are in Marc
Spindelman, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Homiletics, 68 C LEV. S T. L. R EV. 347, 349 n.2 (2020).
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thus openly dismissed in the Court’s pre-Masterpiece Cakeshop, proLGBTQ constitutional rights decisions as so much unconstitutional
discrimination. Religious and moral positions against lesbian and gay
rights were variously held to be—in constitutional terms—forms of illicit
animus (read: hate) or irrationality (read: madness). 60
If these decisions thus struck many faithful conservatives and
traditional moralists as a constitutionally based affront—an affront that
many liberals and progressive secretly or not so secretly cheered—they
also, beyond insult, involved what many perceived to be forms of
constitutional emasculation. They stripped faithful conservatives and
traditional moralists of the political authority they had long enjoyed as, if
not a set of proper constitutional rights, then anyway, constitutionally
affirmed prerogatives, by which they could enforce their normative
visions of what homosexuality’s status under law should look like. 61
Right at the cusp of his retirement from the Court, then poised to
lurch rightward, Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion set out
to shore up, and thus to preserve, the basics of then-existing LGBTQ
constitutional rights up on that hill, but in a way that resituated them atop
a differently inflected vision of the constitutionally governed political
order. Moving from a politically liberal, or libertarian, constitutional
vision that kept religion and morality at the margins and so basically out
of public life, certainly where LGBTQ rights were concerned,
Masterpiece Cakeshop announced that, going forward, LGBTQ
constitutional rights would be protected within a secular and religious
pluralistic constitutional order in which religious conservatism and
traditional moralism, like LGBTQ forms of life, were entitled to full and
equal respect, as constitutionally protected ways to live a good life. 62
In these terms, far from the kinds of social margins marked by queer
Black trans politics, Masterpiece Cakeshop is a precedent in the manner
of an LGBTQ rights version of the joint opinion Justice Kennedy coauthored in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, with its famous “Pax Roeana”:
60. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
574, 577–78 (2003); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 672–76 (2015).
61. This is context for the claim that “the justices have never reversed Supreme Court precedent
to take away a freedom long enjoyed by Americans, with the possible exception of one time, in 1937,”
and that doing so in Dobbs “would violate one of the fundamental-yet-unwritten rules of Supreme
Court jurisprudence that liberal and conservative majorities alike have respected for many years. ”
Noah Feldman, Reversing Roe Would Risk Supreme Court Legitimacy, B LOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 24,
2021),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/reversing-roe-would-risk-supreme-co u rt legitimacy-noah-feldman/.
62. Capturing what are, no doubt, more widely shared sentiments is the critique offered by Kyle
Velte, Postponement as Precedent, 29 S. C AL. R EV. L & S OC. JUST. 1 (2019), on the level of social
meaning.
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a kind of brokered constitutional compromise that, it was hoped, would
preserve “everyone’s” constitutional rights while securing an enduring
constitutional and political peace by giving “all” the parties to these
culture wars investments in the Supreme Court’s authority as a neutral but
fair and trustworthy arbiter. 63 (The truth is: not really “everyone” and not
really “all.”)
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court reaffirmed the basics of proLGBTQ constitutional rights protections while declaring different First
Amendment rights that faithful conservatives and traditional moralists
enjoyed. 64 The Court even recognized that some would-be extensions of
the liberty and equality promises of the Court’s earlier pro-LGBTQ
constitutional rights decisions might have to be sacrificed, snipped at least
at their ostensible margins, so that clashing constitutional values could be
accommodated under the peace sign of strict, strict state neutrality as
between these warring ways of life. 65 Neither side would get everything
they wanted, but then neither side would have reason to fear their basic
ways of living would be subject to their enemies gaining the political, then
legal, upper hand to try to squash them. Hence Masterpiece Cakeshop’s
rule that the state and its agents must not, in service of pro-LGBTQ liberty
and equality promises, be casual in their respect for a neutral stance
between the parties to the case, much as the Court itself had been in its
earlier pro-LGBTQ rights rulings. 66 Masterpiece Cakeshop’s various
opinions made it appear this was a consensus position on the Court.
Though not without some contraindications since, the leading decisions
in Masterpiece Cakeshop’s wake involving LGBTQ rights and the rights
of faithful conservatives and traditional moralists—prominently, Bostock
and, just last year, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia—have broadly
reaffirmed Masterpiece Cakeshop’s delicate Pax Obergefell-ana. 67 Not
even Mississippi’s bull-in-a-china-shop originalism dared disturb it. 68
63. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
64. For discussion that clocks the Court’s offerings, see Spindelman, supra note 59, at 383–90.
65. Id. at 389.
66. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24, 1731. See also Spindelman, supra note 59,
at 357–58.
67. For one of those contraindications, see Nina Totenberg, Justices Thomas, Alito Blast
Supreme Court Decision on Same-Sex Marriage Rights, NPR. ORG (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/10/05/920416357/justices-thomas-alito-blast-supreme-court-decision-ongay-marriage-rights/. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020); Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
68. Nor, exactly, need the Court’s next major case involving LGBTQ rights squaring off against
religious liberties, advanced as First Amendment free speech claims. 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 6
F.4th 1160 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. granted in part, 142 S.Ct. 1106 (Feb. 22, 2022). It is possible the
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How long this peace Masterpiece Cakeshop worked out will hold in
the aftermath of a pro-life originalist decision in Dobbs, particularly as the
Court’s originalist project continues to crest, is anyone’s guess. From a
principled originalist point of view, the distinction that Mississippi offered
the Court in Dobbs, by which it could overturn Roe and Casey while
leaving established pro-LGBTQ constitutional rights rulings like
Lawrence and Obergefell in place, sounded much more in pro-life views
and values proper than anything corresponding to originalist theory as
such. Mississippi’s lawyers told the Dobbs Court that none of its
originalist arguments against Roe and Casey, including its originalist
attack on the general privacy right out of which Roe grew, need be
extended to apply to Lawrence or Obergefell in Dobbs. 69 Those cases,
unlike Roe and Casey, Mississippi explained, did not involve “a right to
destroy human life.” 70
In closer step with Scalian originalist positions on abortion and
LGBTQ rights, opposed to one and all, and more forthcoming about the
likely actual intentions of many faithful, pro-life originalists, is the
position taken up by the Dobbs amicus brief filed by Texas Right to Life,
listing as counsel of record Jonathan Mitchell, the so-called mastermind
behind Texas’ S.B. 8, which has rehearsed the on-the-ground elimination
of abortion rights while Roe and Casey formally remain good law,
meantime sending word out their time is nigh. 71 The brief’s closing
passage speaks with (depending on your views) rousing and spine-chilling
confidence, evidently convinced it is already safe to look beyond a prolife originalist victory in Dobbs to the next-line originalist battles ahead.
Thus, the brief offers an originalist take on Lawrence and Obergefell,
along with some practical advice for the Court.
The Texas Right to Life brief’s originalist line succinctly
characterizes Lawrence and Obergefell as being “as lawless as Roe.”72
Court’s eventual decision in this case will “simply” rebalance the Masterpiece Cakeshop compromise
without displacing it by overturning the underlying pro-LGBTQ constitutional precedents whose
scope it is widely understood to implicate.
69. For distinctions between Roe and Casey, on the one hand, and Lawrence and Obergefell,
on the other, see Brief for Petitioners at 13, 17, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., No. 19-1392
(July 22, 2021). For an argument about the general right to privacy, see id. at 2, 14–18.
70. Id. at 17. For other articulations of the point, see id. at 2, 28. Pro-life locutions, like “unborn
life,” “unborn child,” “unborn human being[],” “unborn girls and boys,” and “the unborn,” are found
elsewhere in the brief. See, e.g., id. at 1; id. at 4; id. at 7; id. at 18; id. at 30.
71. Brief of Texas Right to Life as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 422 (2021) (No. 19-1392); Michael S. Schmidt, Behind the
Texas Abortion Law, a Persevering Conservative Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/12/us/politics/texas-abortion-lawyer-jonathan-mitchell.html/.
72. Brief of Texas Right to Life, supra note 71, at 25.
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Like Roe, neither homosexual sodomy nor same-sex marriage is expressly
protected by the Constitution, and no history or tradition under law,
relevant in a conservative originalist sense, supports them. 73 While that
presumably means they should meet the same fate the brief contemplates
for Roe, the brief tells the Court that it is not necessary to make the
announcement in Dobbs. But, the brief hastens to add, “neither should the
Court hesitate to write an opinion that leaves those decisions [Lawrence
and Obergefell] hanging by a thread.” 74
The brief’s justification for this treatment of Lawrence and
Obergefell—leaving them dangling by a thread without formally
overruling them—is more or less the reason Mississippi offered to the
Court, but with a sly twist. Despite being “as lawless as Roe,” the Texas
Right to Life brief explains, Lawrence and Obergefell do not have to be
treated the same as Roe in Dobbs, because they do not involve the same
degree of threat to life Roe does. Consider the brief’s exact words:
“Lawrence and Obergefell, while far less hazardous to human life, are as
lawless as Roe.” 75
The curious precision of the brief’s negative comparison of Roe with
Lawrence and Obergefell—the latter two cases being “far less hazardous
to human life” than Roe, not simply non-hazardous to them—resurfaces
old school associations by which cisheterosexuality and homosexuality
and gender non-binarism have been seen as different and properly
hierarchized. Whereas cisheterosexuality has traditionally been associated
through ideas about procreation and childbirth with health, vitality, life,
and regeneration, by negative implication and in contrast, homosexuality
and gender non-conformity have traditionally run through ideas about
their non-procreativity to a sense that they involve degeneration,
barrenness, waste, disease, decay, weakness, and death, life’s very end. 76
Seen in these terms, and reminiscent of how some of these associations
carried the day in the mid-1980s when Bowers v. Hardwick declared
homosexual sodomy not to be encompassed by constitutional privacy
guarantees during an important moment in the HIV/AIDS pandemic,
Lawrence and Obergefell, on the Texas Right to Life brief’s view, look to
partake of what has sometimes been characterized as a “culture of

73. Id. at 24–25.
74. Id. at 25.
75. Id. at 25.
76. See, e.g., Marc Spindelman, Sexuality’s Law, 24 C OLUM. J. GENDER & L. 87, 100 (2013).
For a different phantasmatic escalation in the context of trans identity, see Spindelman, The Shower’s
Return, supra note 24, at 160–73.
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death.” 77 The brief was urging the Court not to miss this, and to
acknowledge these dimensions of Lawrence and Obergefell even as it
preserved them through a ruling that prefigured their eventual demise on
originalist grounds.
Re-upping queer Black trans politics and their angles of vision onto
social life, there is a question about what it means for the Texas Right to
Life’s brief to line up Lawrence and Obergefell as lawless rulings
associated with a culture of death as conditions for how the Supreme
Court should respond to them. Without overlooking how these lawless
threats to “ordinary” life may sound in racial registers, the Texas Right to
Life brief’s suggestion that the Court string Lawrence and Obergefell up
and leave them publicly hanging by a thread figures them as both alive,
and, immanently dead—a death that will, like Dobbs, vindicate a
conservative, traditionalist culture of life.
This is yet another, potent reminder, were any needed, of the deep,
intense, and both racialized and gendered passions that pro-life
constitutional originalism unleashes and channels in the setting of
abortion rights that already involves—and anticipates—carry-overs into
other LGBTQ constitutional rights. If Mississippi’s lawyers spoke to the
Court about reasonable public debate and political compromise around
abortion, the Texas Right to Life brief shows how hard that is going to be
in Dobbs’ wake when, even before it comes down, both gloves—and
bets—are off. 78 Given how the Court’s originalist decisions have already
allowed Black trans and other Black LGBTQ people’s constitutional
rights to be rolled back, and given what the Court in Dobbs seems likely
to do to devastate the abortion right, a right that Black trans and other
LGBTQ people have relied on, the momentum continues to build toward
an originalist coup de grace for those LGBTQ constitutional rights that,
up on the hill, seem in their basics, anyway, safe—for now.

77. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). On the Hardwick point, see, for example, Brief of Amicus Curiae
David Robinson, Jr., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140). For counterpoints on
the “end” of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and its racial, gender, and class constructions, compare Andrew
Sullivan, When Plagues End, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/10/
magazine/when-plagues-end.html, with generally, TRANS IN A TIME OF HIV/AIDS (Che Gossett &
Eva S. Hayward eds., 2021), and Linda Villarosa, America’s Hidden H.I.V. Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (June 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/magazine/americas-hidden-hiv epidemic.html/. On the “culture of death,” see Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae [The Gospel of
Life], VATICAN (Mar. 25, 1995, https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/
documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae.html .
78. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 5–6.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As everyone awaits the Court’s decision in Dobbs, this much is
certain: Queer Black trans politics—significantly themselves politics of
precarity built at the de-centered margins of social, including political and
legal, life—entail ample resources for generating new angles of vision on
how power is organized and deployed, including by the Supreme Court
through its originalist project, now plainly on the march. 79 Thinking with
queer Black trans politics helps to illuminate some of the ways that proBlack intersectional thinking is now being met—and reworked—by
different legal actors in politically regressive directions through practices
of intersectional thinking that, without necessarily using those terms,
racially recast progressive rights claims, like claims about abortion and
LGBTQ rights, in order to stop or defeat them. Even more, thinking with
queer Black trans politics broadly indicates the ongoing need to rethink
how constitutional civil rights are conceived. Challenging dominant forms
of legal and political consciousness, that work—if not in precisely the
same ways as more well-known forms of intersectional praxis that engage
constitutional civil rights—may seem to some to be utopian, perhaps
pointless, even downright dangerous, given how it may imperil
established constitutional civil rights guarantees. Still, the high stepping
of the Supreme Court’s now-majoritarian originalist project, precisely by
circumscribing and eliminating existing civil rights protections, may
paradoxically help clear space for the intellectual and legal work of
building a constitutional future out of intersectional ideals—including the
prospect that intersectionality writ large might hold room center stage for
queer Black trans lives. 80
It is presently difficult to imagine a pro-queer-Black-trans
constitutionalism that, as a national consensus position, delivers queer
Black trans people the constitutional promises of liberty and equality that
they deserve. This is especially true now that so many progressives are
expressing a principled skepticism about the Supreme Court’s central
place within U.S. legal and political life. 81 That the prospects of a
79. On the “politics of location,” see Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical
Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. R EV. 1805, 1831 (1993) (quoting Adrienne Rich, Notes
Toward a Politics of Location (1984), in B LOOD, B READ AND POETRY: S ELECTED P ROSE 1979–1985,
at 210 (1986)).
80. These efforts might build on the kind of abolitionist constitutionalism described in Roberts,
supra note 8.
81. For one recent statement that circulated widely, see Written Statement of Nikolas
Bowie, The Contemporary Debate Over
Supreme Court Reform: Origins and
Perspectives, Presidential Comm’n on the Sup. Ct. of the U.S. (June 30, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Bowie-SCOTUS-Testimony.pdf.
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Supreme Court-centered constitutionalism will secure the future of queer
Black trans liberation are so dim may, in different terms, actually be just
fine to some who embrace queer Black trans politics. Queer Black trans
collectives, as well as queer Black trans activists and organizers, have
variously suggested they are broadly uninterested in entrusting queer
Black trans people’s welfare and futures to institutional and political
governors or other social managers who have, sometimes with the
cooperation of “white club” LGBTQ politics, left queer Black trans
communities largely to fend for themselves, their security, their lives, and
their worlds.
Recognizing queer Black trans politics’ illuminating powers—
powers that can help to demystify what conventions of legal and political
consciousness represent as happening in the current constitutional and
political moment—it seems practically wise for LGBTQ communities to
give these politics a broad-based and active witness. If, realistically, the
time for that witness may not have quite arrived, it soon may—in that
moment of urgency and even crisis, if and when Dobbs comes down as
expected, threatening the doctrinal foundations of LGBTQ constitutional
rights up on the hill, which seem so likely to foment new, on-the-ground
political challenges to established LGBTQ rights. Who has missed some
of the more prominent anti-trans and anti-gay ways these challenges have
already started heating up? 82 As the fire that has been burning in the valley
of LGBTQ rights moves up the hill, it may, at last, become clear that queer
Black trans politics are in a genealogical line that traces back to the
forbearers of today’s LGBTQ communities and the forbearers of race and
sex equality rights. At the margins and outsides of normative social life,
queer Black trans politics have been being forged in distinctively intense
fires of oppression that exist in those social locations. These politics can
thus withstand that heat as they chart political pathways forward.
Looking ahead to political conflicts within LGBTQ communities
whose contours are already possible to discern: As older “white club”
LGBTQ politics increasingly experience the temptation to reassert and recenter themselves at the expense of queer Black trans political “freedomdreaming and visionary world-making,” it will be important to remember
that queer Black trans politics require a major flex and deep selftransformation for those inclined to the old LGBTQ political ways. 83 As
even some LGBTQ allies who claim solid queer Black trans political
82. See supra note 30.
83. JENNIFER C. NASH, B LACK F EMINISM R EIMAGINED: AFTER INTERSECTIONALITY 130
(2019).
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credentials have been learning and teaching, these self-transformations
are, for many, much easier to think or speak about than to practice and
live. The depth of queer Black trans challenges to established “white club”
ways of living and doing politics, including identity politics, will,
therefore, require repeated reassurances and reminders about what has
lately been being gained by efforts that many LGBTQ people and
institutions have engaged in, as they have re-centered themselves, their
politics, and their identities around pro-trans, and, often separately,
around pro-Black LGBTQ politics. The question is whether the comfort
and the past successes of the old political ways will again win out over the
politics and identities of precarity and location. These politics are hard,
but they have queer Black trans liberation—and the liberation of all
people—directly in their sights, not as practices of “trickle down” so much
as “trickle up” politics. 84
A palpable sense is afoot within the spaces that queer Black trans
politics are building. It suggests that LGBTQ communities—like so many
others—are facing critical inflection points that will define the futures and
freedoms that people in these communities have or lack. Here is Raquel
Willis during the 2020 Brooklyn Liberation March, thinking aloud about
Black trans lives that have been needlessly and tragically lost before their
time, and about all the Black trans spirits that have passed over,
prophesying while declaring the realities and dreams of queer Black trans
power: “And the reckoning is here. The reckoning is here, y’all.” 85 The
reckoning is here. Then, looking to the future—the future we all now
inhabit and the future that has also yet to arrive—Willis asked a question
that must now, in some way, be asked again and again: “So when you
leave here today, we might be silent today, but tomorrow we’re not gonna
be silent, right?” 86
The kind of political reckoning, speech, and action that Willis spoke
toward—the inward-looking and outward-facing reckoning that LGBTQ
communities now confront—involves both individual and collective
84. On “trickle down” and “trickle up” politics, see, for instance, Duggan, supra note 17, at
182–83, and Rob Nichols, An Interview with Dean Spade, Toward a Critical Trans Politics, 14
UPPING THE ANTI : A J. OF THEORY AND ACTION 37, 47–49 (2013). For important related discussion
suggesting that queer Black politics may challenge the scope and configurations of the political itself,
see Zane McNeill & Kyra Smith, Whose Pride Is This Anyway? The Quare Performance of the #Black
Pride 4, in P ALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF QUEER AND TRANS F EMINISMS IN C ONTEMPORARY
P ERFORMANCE (T. Rosenberg et al., eds., 2021), and Zoie (Zane) McNeill & Blu Buchannan, Tracing
the Color of Queer
Choreopolitics (Jan. 13, 2020), ACTIVIST HIST. R EV.,
https://activisthistory.com/2020/01/13/tracing-the-color-of-queer-choreopolitics/.
85. Raquel Willis, I Believe in Black Trans Power, YOUTUBE, at 09:11 (June 17, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bq1w7glqwkU/.
86. Id.
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political struggle that must be seen, understood, and acted upon as such.
If it is to succeed, gaining all LGBTQ people the kind of liberation that
many have yearned for as the animating, multigenerational spirit of hope
for LGBTQ communities’ transformative politics, this struggle must be
undertaken as Chase Strangio said in a loving remembrance honoring
Lorena Borjas, “the mother, guardian, hero and healer of the transgender
community in Jackson Heights, Queens”: “Every single day,
relentlessly.” 87

87. Chase Strangio, Lorena Borjas, WASH. P OST: OPINIONS (Apr. 1,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/01/lorena-borjas-guardian-healer-transcommunity-new-york/.

2020),

